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Figure 1 Overview of bank fees and contributions
Financial Contributions and Bank 
Fees in the Banking Union
Lucia Országhová, Martina Mišková 
Národná banka Slovenska 1
The banking union has brought substantial changes to the functioning of the financial 
sector in the EU, including new bank fees and contributions. This article reviews the different 
fees and contributions introduced by the new framework, paying particular attention to 
those imposed at the EU level. The crisis marked a turning point, and the focus is now on 
breaking the vicious cycle between private banks and public finances by transferring the 
costs of any future failure to the credit institutions themselves. 
Overview Of bank fees and 
cOntributiOns 
In response to the financial crisis that emerged in 
2008, the European Commission pursued a number 
of initiatives, in line with de Larosière report, to cre-
ate a safer and sounder financial sector for the sin-
gle European market. These include stronger mi-
cro and macro prudential requirements for banks, 
unified rules for crisis management and in a later 
phase improved depositor protection. As the crisis 
evolved and turned into the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis, it became evident that a deeper inte-
grated framework in the euro area was needed. 
This led to a new institutional structure and the 
creation of the Banking Union for the euro area. 
As a result of the implementation of the first 
two pillars of the Banking Union – the Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Reso-
lution Mechanism (SRM),2 the European Central 
Bank (ECB) has been conferred with supervisory 
tasks and a new EU agency – the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB), has been created as a separate legal 
entity. In line with the practice in many European 
countries, the costs of their functioning will be fully 
covered by the banking sector (see Figure 1 for an 
overview of administrative fees). The introduction 
of new European-wide fees is without prejudice to 
the right of national authorities to impose bank lev-
ies in accordance with national law, as many have 
already done before or during the financial turmoil. 
As such, the EU-wide and national administrative 
fees will co-exist in many country cases.
Besides the administrative fees, which aim at 
covering the costs of functioning of the new in-
1 The authors would like to acknowl-
edge the comments and suggestions 
by Peter Pénzeš and Ján Klacso (both 
Národná banka Slovenska). The 
article should not be reported as 
representing the views of Národná 
banka Slovenska (NBS) or any other 
institutions the authors have been 
associated with. The views expressed 
and mistakes made remain of the 
authors.
2 For further details on the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (pillar I) refer 
to Čillíková and Pénzeš (2012) and 
on the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(pillar II) to Čillíková et al (2013).
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following the financial crisis that credit institutions 
should financially participate in an effective reso-
lution of a failing bank and the related protection 
of depositors. This decision needs to be seen in 
a broader perspective of government interven-
tions into the financial sector during the recent 
financial turmoil. To avoid a collapse of the entire 
system, many national authorities within the EU in-
tervened by providing banks with credit lines, loan 
guarantees and capital injections. However the 
collapse of the banking sector was avoided at stag-
gering costs: As estimated by the European Com-
mission (2012), the level of guarantees and liquidity 
measures accounted for 5.4% of GDP and recapi-
talisation and costs of impaired assets for 0.25% of 
GDP (€682.9 billion and €31.7 billion respectively). 
To lower the probability of occurrence of banking 
crisis and to internalise the costs of bank distress 
within the EU, policy makers have agreed on uni-
fied EU-wide rules, imposing financial contribu-
tions of credit institutions to the resolution funds 
and to the deposit guarantee schemes. It is worth 
mentioning that the national resolution funds of 
all countries participating in the Banking Union 
will be replaced by the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF) as of 2016 and the bank contributions will be 
gradually mutualised (for more details, see one of 
the following sections). However, no joint deposit 
guarantee scheme, where the cost of insuring de-
positors is shared within the euro area, has been 
agreed up to date. The deposit guarantee schemes 
will thus remain so far at the national level. 
Furthermore, as a reaction to the crisis, some 
European countries introduced national bank 
levies. They could be seen as a special category 
among bank contributions as the European leg-
islation foresees that mandatory contributions 
from these schemes could be taken into account 
for the resolution funds as well as for the deposit 
guarantee schemes.3 Furthermore, as indicated in 
Figure 1 and in line with national legislation, they 
could be used for different purposes within the 
three pillars of the Banking Union (for more de-
tails, see one of the following sections). 
Figure 1 provides an overview of all possible fees 
and contributions imposed on credit institutions 
operating within the Banking Union.4 As the whole 
framework has been created only recently, most 
of the newly introduced fees will be phased in as 
of 2015. Figure 2 therefore provides an illustrative 
quantification of expected costs to be paid by all 
liable European entities in 2015. The data are based 
on publicly announced estimates of different bank 
fees and contributions, with the contributions to 
the funds representing the bulk of the overall fi-
nancial obligations of the credit institutions.
Their calculation and payment is based on a set 
of regulations and legislative acts,5 which impose 
different obligations on the liable entities. They 
have an obligation to provide relevant information 
to different responsible authorities, such as contact 
details for the fee notice or data for the calculation 
of the bank contribution. The non- provision of 
these details is considered as a breach of the re-
spective legislative act and may trigger sanctions.6 
Furthermore, they are obliged to pay their part 
within the deadline (usually due between 30 and in 
35 days after the issuance of the fee notice). In case 
of partial payment or non-payment of the fees, the 
responsible authority is entitled to accrue interest 
on a daily basis on the unpaid amount, accrued at 
a rate of the ECB main refinancing rate plus 8 per-
centage points per annum from the date on which 
the payment was due until the date preceding the 
date on which the unpaid amount was credited, as 
well as to impose sanctions on the violating entity. 
Table 1 summarises some of the obligations 
foreseen on credit institutions during the period 
2014-2015, namely with reference to the adminis-
tration fees paid to the ECB and the SRB as well as 
the contribution to the national resolution funds 
(NRF). This list is not exhaustive as it does not in-
clude reporting obligations with respect to fees 
imposed at the national level, or the obligations 
resulting from the legislation which is currently 
in the consultation phase. It should be acknowl-
edged that the fee and contribution framework is 
still in its creation phase and individual legislative 
acts have been created in certain separation. This 
might thus have resulted in some overlaps and 
parallel obligations towards different layers of the 
institutional framework. Given this fact as well as 
the general increase in the reporting obligations 
of all credit institutions, some harmonisation 
in the reporting obligations with respect to the 
bank fees and contributions could be foreseen 
going forward, i.e. as part of the planned review 
of the relevant regulations.7 
eu-wide administrative fees
As of 2015, credit institutions will be exposed to 
new EA-wide administrative fees related to the 
creation of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and 
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Figure 2 Bank fees and contributions in in 2015 (EUR millions)
Source: Authors´ compilation based on different public announcements.
Note: Abbreviations as in Chart 1.
3 Article 100 of Directive 2014/59/EU and 
Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU.
4 The national fees and contributions 
are subject to national discretion and 
might not be applied in all Member 
States. In parallel, some banks may 
be exposed to other administrative 
costs at the national level, such as an 
annual fee for audit services in the 
case of the Slovak Republic.
5 For more details, see references to 
relevant (draft) legislative acts at the 
end of this article.
6 Moreover, if the institution fails to 
provide data, the competent author-
ity has the right to determine the 
missing risk indicators or to assign to 
the entity the highest risk profile.
7 For example, the review of the 
regulation on supervisory fees will be 
carried out by 2017 and the review 
of the implementation of the BRRD 
directive in 2018.
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to the delegation of supervisory tasks to the ECB. 
According to legislative acts,8 they will largely fol-
low the same principles (see Figure 3). 
First, the calculation and payment of the admin-
istrative fees will be executed at the group level 
and at the highest level of consolidation within 
the participating EU Member States.9 Given the 
fact that the fees are paid on a consolidated basis 
(and not at individual institution level), it is difficult 
to estimate their impact on the national banking 
systems. It is however worth noticing that in line 
with the ECB regulation10 the supervised group 
can nominate any of the entities in the group 
to serve as a fee debtor. The fee debtor will be 
a single entity nominated from among all entities 
of the supervised group and it will take the role 
of a fee debtor on behalf of the whole group. In 
other words, the fee debtor will not necessary be 
the 'parent' institution, but it could be any of its 
subsidiaries. For the sake of transparency in the 
nomination process, a notification about a fee 
debtor must be signed on behalf of all supervised 
entities within the group. Furthermore, the ECB 
provides for additional flexibility with respect to 
these nominations: The group has the right to no-
tify the ECB each year in case of any changes to 
the fee debtor. 
Second, the calculation of the fees will be 
based on the full cost principle, including both 
direct costs for their core functions (supervisory 
functions in the case of the ECB) and indirect 
costs from supporting services. The reimbursable 
costs will cover expenditures related to premises, 
accounting, legal services, HR management, in-
ternal audit, as well as statistical and IT services. 
The ECB will not recover costs that were incurred 
before it resumed its supervisory powers, i.e. be-
fore 4 November 2014. The contrary is true for 
the Single Resolution Board (SRB). It will become 
fully operational its powers as of 1 January 2016 
(with some tasks exercising as of 1 January 2015), 
however it has an autonomous budget as of 19 
August 2014 and it will thus collect instalments 
during the provisional period of 2014 and 2015. 
The credit institutions will be charged in ad-
vance, based on the qualified estimates of costs 
to perform their tasks in that particular year. The 
first fee notices will be issued in 2015 and will cov-
er both the advance payment for 2015 and pay-
ment for the first fee period of 2014 (i.e. August 
- December in the case of the SRB and November 
- December in the case of the ECB). Any surplus or 
deficit from a previous year, arising from the dif-
ference between the amount collected and the 
actual expenditure, will be deducted or added to 
the next advance payment. 
cOntributiOns tO the resOlutiOn 
fund
As of 1 January 2015, all EU Member States will 
create a National Resolution Fund (NRF).11 In case 
of those EU countries participating in the second 
pillar of the Banking Union, the NRF will be re-
placed by the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) as of 
1 January 2016.12 The main aim of the resolution 
fund is to raise financial resources, which could be 
used by the resolution authority in times of a dis-
tress for an effective application of the resolution 
tools and powers.
Contributions to both the NRF and the SRF are 
based on the same principles and methodology, 
specified in detail in the delegated acts.13 First, the 
contributions to the resolution funds are raised 
on individual basis (as opposed to their calcula-
tion at the group level). Second, the contributions 
partially reflect the size of the liable institutions, 
measured by their relative share of the amount 
of liabilities excluding own funds and covered 
deposits. The size of an institution could be re-
garded, within the resolution framework, as the 
first indicator of the risk. This is given by the fact 
that the larger an institution is the more likely it is, 
in case of distress, that it would be resolved and 
the resolution funds will be used. Third, the basic 
contribution (based on the size) is further adjust-
ed by the risk profile of an institution, with a risk 
adjusting multiplier ranging between 0.8 and 1.5. 
As for the definition of the risk profile of institu-
tions, a rather complex system has been agreed 
(see Box 2). It is based on four risk pillars with dif-
ferent indicators, including some newly proposed 
indicators introduced by the CRDIV/CRR. This 
31 December 2014 Nomination of a fee debtor 
(2015) Instalment notice by the SRB
1 March 2014 Providing contact details of a fee debtor
(2015) + 30 days Payment deadline for the SRB administrative fee
1 July 2015 Submission of fee factors to the ECB
1 September 2015 Submission of information for calculation of contributions 
(H2 2015) Issuance of a fee notice by the ECB
(H2 2015) + 35 days Payment deadline for the ECB supervisory fee
30 November 2015 Notification of contribution by the NRF
31 December 2015 Payment deadline for the contribution to the NRF
Table 1 Key dates in 2014 and 2015
Source: Authors’ compilation based on (draft) legislative acts.
  ECB supervisory fee     Contribution to NRF     SRB administrative fee
8 The primary legislative acts repre-
sent the SRM Regulation (Regula-
tion No 806/2014, namely Articles 
59 and 65) and the SSM Framework 
Regulation (Council Regulation 
No. 1024/2013, namely Article 30). 
The ECB supervisory fees are further 
specified in the ECB Regulation  
No. ECB/2014/41 and the ad-
ministrative fees to the SFR in the 
Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) No 1310/2014.
9 Euro area countries and non-euro 
area Member States that voluntarily 
participate in the SSM and the SRM. 
10 ECB Regulation No. ECB/2014/41
11 The creation of the NRF is subject 
to the transposition of the relevant 
legislation (Directive 2014/59/EU, 
further referred as “BRRD Directive”)
12 There is currently some discussion 
ongoing about keeping the NRF 
for collecting contributions from 
entities not contributing to SRF.
13 Commission Delegated regulation 
(EU) supplementing Directive 
2014/59/EU with regard to ex ante 
contributions to resolution finan-
cing arrangements..
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might pose some challenges for the calculation 
of the risk profile of credit institutions in 2015, in 
particular due to limited data availability, as the 
risk profile will be quantified based on 2013 data. 
Moreover, some might argue that the definition 
of recently introduced indicators has not been 
fully standardised and for the sake of objectivity, 
they should be rather excluded from the assess-
ment. In this robust framework, small institutions 
have been granted an exception to the risk-based 
approach. They will pay a lump-sum instead (di-
vided into six categories).
Despite the same methodology for defining 
the contributions for the NRF and the SRF, there 
is a substantial difference in terms of the scope or 
coverage of the respective funds. Within the NRF, 
the target level as well as the relative riskiness of 
any individual institution is defined with respect 
to all the institutions authorised in the territory of 
a single country (e.g. Germany), whereas within 
the SRF, they are calculated with respect to all the 
institutions authorised in the territory of all par-
ticipating EU Member States. Given the difference 
in the scope, the transition from one approach 
to another might lead to important variations 
in the annual contributions of some institutions 
between 2015 and 2016. This is in particular true 
for coutries with institutions which hold relatively 
smaller (larger) amounts of covered deposits and 
thus their contributions would be higher (small-
er) under the single target level of the SRM com-
pared to the national target level. Furthermore, 
the relative riskiness of an institution also impacts 
the calculation, i.e. an institution could be regard-
ed as relatively risky within the national borders 
whereas it might pursue conservative policies 
when an EU-wide comparison is drawn, which 
might reduce the contribution under the EU-
wide approach. Given the discrepancies between 
the two systems (the national and SRM scope), an 
adjustment mechanism during the initial period 
of eight years has been proposed in the imple-
mentation act.14 It is based on a non-linear phas-
ing-in of the contributions calculated on the ba-
sis of a single target level and phasing-out of the 
contributions calculated on the basis of national 
target levels. The phasing-in/out principle reflects 
the idea of progressive mutualisation of national 
contributions, registered in the so-called 'national 
compartments' in the transition period of eight 
years, after which they will cease to exist. 
The resolution authorities have to ensure that by 
the end of 202415 the resolution fund will reach at 
least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all 
credit institutions (authorised in a single EU Mem-
ber State for the NRF or in all of the participating EU 
Member States for the SRF). During that period, the 
annual contributions should be determined and 
spread out in time as evenly as possible until the 
target level is reached, with taking due considera-
Source: Authors.
Notes: Only bank fees and contributions based on EU legislation are presented. Abbreviations as in Chart 1. SRMR refers 
to Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014, BRRD to Directive 2014/59/EU, DGSD to Directive 2014/49/EU, IA to an implementing 
act and DA to a delegated act. 
1) This refers to the transitional period after which the risk profile will be included. 2) Ongoing discussion about introdu-
cing the risk profile. 3) Institutions involved in the SRM will pay to the NRF in 2015 only and their contribution for 2015 
will be transferred to the SRF afterwards.
Figure 3 Key characteristics of different bank fees and contributions
14 Proposal for a Council Implemen-
ting Regulation (COM (2014) 710 
final).
15 This date is explicitly specified in 
the BRRD (Directive 2014/59/EU) 
and implicitly in the SRM regulation 
(Regulation No 806/2014), subject 
to certain provision of the latter 
legislative act coming into force.
Administrative fees Contributions to funds
Fee 
calculation Group level Group level
Individual 
level
Individual 
level
Individual 
level
Starting 
date
4 November 
2014
17 August 
2014
1 January 
2016
1 January 
2015
n.a.
NDGFECB SRB SRF NRF
Period  Annually Annually
Annually 
(2016-2024)
Annually  
(2015(-2024))3)
Annually 
(until 2024 )
Legislation SRMR/DA SRMR /IA BRRD/DA DGSD
COM &  ECB 
Regulations
Base/Cover
age SRM SRM National NationalSSM
Target
Full cost 
coverage
Full cost 
coverage
1% of covered 
deposits
1% of covered 
deposits
0.8 % of covered 
deposits
Criteria
Size + Risk 
profile
Size 1) Size + Risk 
profile
Size + Risk 
profile Size 
2)
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tion to the phase of the business cycle and any im-
pact of pro-cyclical measures on the financial posi-
tion of contributing institutions. The funds should 
be raised primarily by annual ex-ante contribu-
tions, which will be collected until the target level is 
reached. The legislation also foresees extraordinary 
ex-post contributions, which will be called upon 
in cases when the available financial resources in 
the resolution fund are not sufficient to cover any 
losses, costs or other expenses incurred.
cOntributiOns tO the depOsit 
Guarantee schemes
The financial crisis led to a substantial revision of 
the European legislation on deposit guarantee 
schemes. Despite increased harmonisation of the 
approach, no progress has been achieved so far 
with respect to the implementation of the third 
pillar of the Banking Union and the creation of 
a single deposit guarantee scheme. Deposit guar-
antee schemes thus remain at the national level.
Originally implemented in 1994 with the mini-
mum harmonisation approach, the financing of 
the deposit guarantee schemes was left entirely 
to the EU Member States. Following the finan-
cial crisis, a decision was made to gradually in-
crease the level of deposit protection to uniform 
EUR 100 000 by the end of 2010 and to unify the 
methodology for calculating the contributions to 
the national schemes.16 Furthermore, all national 
schemes need to ensure that they possess suf-
ficient financial means, reaching at least a target 
level of 0.8% of the amount of the covered de-
posits within their respective EU Member State 
As of 4 November 2014, the ECB has assumed 
responsibility for euro area banking supervi-
sion. As part of the SSM, which comprises of 
the ECB and national competent authorities 
of participating EU Member States, the ECB di-
rectly supervises 120 significant banking gro-
ups. As for all other 3500 less significant credit 
institutions, it sets and monitors supervisory 
standards. The difference in the supervisory 
effort of the ECB has been reflected in the 
system for calculation of the annual supervi-
sory fee. The annual costs will be allocated to 
the two categories of supervised entities on 
the basis of the costs assigned to the relevant 
ECB functions (direct supervision and indirect 
supervision, respectively). In the second step, 
the costs of the ECB horizontal functions will 
be divided between the two categories on 
the basis of each category’s share in the direct 
costs.
The fee consists of a minimum fee component, 
which will cover 10 percent of the total costs 
within each category split equally among the fee 
debtors in that category, and a variable fee com-
ponent. The minimum fee component reflects 
a contribution for participating in the system or 
a floor in the fee per supervised entity. For smal-
ler significant institutions with total assets of €10 
billion or less, the minimum fee component is hal-
ved. The variable fee component covers the rema-
ining amount of the fee after the deduction of the 
minimum fee component. It reflects the relative 
importance of each institution, measured by the 
total value of assets, and the risk profile of each 
entity, measured by total risk exposure. They are 
calculated at the highest level of consolidation of 
supervised banks and receive equal weight. This 
means that larger and riskier banks that require 
more supervisory effort pay a higher variable fee 
component.
Box 1
ECB supervisory fees 
Box 2
Source: Draft Commission Delegated Regulation (C(2014) 7674/3).
Risk pillars Weights
Risk exposure  50%
Own funds and eligible liabilities held in excess of MREL
Leverage ratio
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Total Risk Exposure / Total Assets
25%
25%
25%
25%
Stability and variety of sources of funding 20%
Net Stable Funding Ratio
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
50%
50%
Importance of an institution to the stability of the financial system 10%
Share of interbank loans and deposits 100%
Additional risk indicators, as determined by the resolution authority 20%
16 Further harmonisation was achie-
ved as regards the shortening of the 
repayment period, with its gradual 
reduction to 7 days until 2024.
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by mid-2024. The financial means are collected 
from credit institutions via ex-ante contributions 
and in case of distress, extraordinary ex-post con-
tributions could also be introduced. Furthermore, 
and in line with the general approach, there is 
currently an on-going discussion about changing 
the calculation of the bank contributions towards 
more risk-based approach.
cOnclusiOns
The lessons learned from the financial crisis cou-
pled with the introduction of the new institution-
al framework has brought an overhaul to the then 
existing structure of bank fees and contributions 
at both the European and the national levels. 
With the unification of the supervisory practices 
and rules, one could observe an introduction of 
several EU-wide bank fees and contributions. 
Although the final framework is still being shaped 
and is thus subject to changes, an overarching prin-
ciple has emerged: A strong emphasis is placed on 
the risk approach where the credit institutions with 
high leverage and risk exposure are contributing 
more to the system. It reflects the increased effort 
of different competent authorities in monitoring its 
health and higher impact of their possible failure for 
the overall stability of the financial sector. 
Given the scope and extend of the changes, 
both in terms of the new prudential requirements 
as well as in terms of the new structure of bank 
fees and contributions, it is difficult to predict 
the overall impact of the new framework on the 
financial sector. There is strong premise that the 
new reality will lead to an effective and more resil-
ient European financial system and the end of the 
vicious cycle between the sovereign and banks.
The national bank levies introduced in many EU countries in the wake of financial crisis could be 
seen as predecessors for the unified EU-wide contributions to the resolution funds. Over the peri-
od between 2009 and 2012, fourteen EU countries1 have implemented them, in line with the IMF 
recommendation (IMF 2010) to use them as a tool to increase revenue collection from the financial 
sector as well as to contribute to financial stability by incentivizing banks to adopt less risky capital 
structures.
They differ substantially in design, with 11 EU Member States levying some total liabilities (mostly 
net of covered deposits), whereas three countries have adopted bank levies that are conceptually 
quite different, with France considering the minimum amount of capital necessary to comply with 
the regulatory requirements as the taxable base and Hungary and Slovenia levying total assets.2 
Contrary to the new EU approach, the bank levy is considered as a contribution to the state budget 
in most cases (with a few country exceptions where a specialised fund was created). This approach 
should be seen primarily in a broader perspective as most of the countries, with the exception of 
Slovakia and Hungary, directly contributed to the bank rescue during the recent crisis. Also, levy 
rates vary substantially, with most countries implementing a flat rate. For the group of countries 
with a broadly similar tax base, defined as total liabilities minus covered deposits, the rate varies 
from 0.01% (Portugal) to 0.2% (Slovakia).3 
The anecdotal evidence points to a different approach to the future of national bank levies after 
the implementation of the common EU-wide rules for bank contributions to resolution funds. The 
Federal Ministry of Finance of Germany declared that the current national system will be replaced 
by the new European bank levy. On contrary, Austrian representatives stated in April that the natio-
nal bank levy would remain active as a contribution of the banking sector to the state aid provided 
in the past, whereas the single European resolution mechanism is regarded as an instrument for 
any future bank distress. Another country that is considering keeping the national bank levy is 
Slovakia. 
In light of all obligations imposed on the banking sector from the new regulation as well as from 
all new EU-wide bank fees and contributions, It is worth emphasising that any additional national 
bank levy needs to be carefully considered against the back of high concentration within the single 
European market for financial services.
1 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.
2 For further details see Devereux et al (2013).
3 The original rate of 0.4% was halved after the total levy paid by banks reached €500 million in Slovakia.
Box 3
National Bank Levies: Anecdotal evidence for 
their future application
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